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Immigration Can
Alleviate the Ageing
Problem
By Prof. Dr Joan Muysken Prof. Dr Joan Muysken Prof. Dr Joan Muysken Prof. Dr Joan Muysken Prof. Dr Joan Muysken*
This article explains how immigration can alleviate the burden that ageing poses for the welfare
states of most western economies. It uses the results of a macroeconomic model to outline the
impact of ageing and immigration on economic growth. It concludes that immigration can
indeed make a positive contribution as long as the immigrants are able to find work. Moreover,
as immigrants become better educated, they make a higher contribution to economic growth.
1. 1. 1. 1. 1. Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
The European Union has recently adopted a new
immigration policy, which includes the introduction of the
“blue card”, a European work permit similar to the American
“green card”. Apart from the treatment of highly skilled
migrants, also the admission and procedures for seasonal
workers, paid trainees and intra-corporate transferees will
be regulated during the next few years (see EP, 2007). The
new policy aims at solving skill shortages resulting from an
ageing population. Eurostat predicts that the over-65
population will rise from 15.4% in 1995 to 22.4% by 2025,
and the working-age population will shrink by over 50
million by 2050 (EU, 2005a).
In this article we consider whether the new emphasis on
skills is justified or not. Our analysis leads us to the
conclusion that economic growth in the fast-aging EU will
be sustained by immigration that enables EU countries to
keep a balanced mix of skills in their labour markets.
According to Freeman (2006) immigration has been
very important to tackle skill shortages in the US, even
though the greying of the labour force is less severe than in
Europe. His analysis shows that skill shortages caused by a
rising demand for highly-skilled workers are ameliorated
by both an increase in the proportion of well-educated
workers in US multinational firms outside the US, and a
large inflow of foreign scientists and engineers. These
developments have been made possible by the spread of
mass education in many low-wage countries.
In two other papers (Muysken et al. (2008a), (2008b))
we investigate the conditions under which immigration
contributes to solving the lack of labour supply that results
from an ageing population. Immigration alone cannot
keep economic output at a high level. It is also necessary to
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use other measures such as increasing the rate of labour
force participation, particularly in the older age classes.
Therefore we use the ratio of the working age population
to the total population as an important variable in their
analysis. We take the case of the Netherlands to illustrate
their theoretical reasoning of how immigration can alleviate
the ageing problem. In that context it is interesting to note
that in the Netherlands there are many concerns among
citizens, politicians and the Netherlands Bureau of Economic
Policy Analysis – an official independent research institute
advising the Dutch government – on more liberal
immigration policies (see e.g. Muysken et al. 2007).
Although the blue card seems to be a good instrument
to attract more higher educated individuals, we show that
it may be beneficial for the European Union to attract also
immigrants who have not graduated from universities as
long as the skill distribution of the immigrants is on average
not below that of the EU countries. It is, however, very
important that immigrants are in paid employment, so that
the goods and services they produce can be consumed by
the growing share of the population that has retired.
Also the skill level of immigrants should be of second
importance as long as they work, since low-skilled working
immigrants can pay for the pensions of the retired people
as well as the benefits of the unemployed native workers.
Jobs for these immigrants can be available in for example
construction, cleaning, security, personal care and domestic
activities.1 Therefore the immigration policy of the European
Union regarding the blue card, even when it is extended to
regulate the admission of, for example, seasonal workers,
may be too restrictive to maximise the benefits from
immigration in the light of an ageing population. We show
that the benefits from immigration could proliferate further
if policy makers focus on an increase of the ratio of the
working to the inactive population in general. The aim of
our theoretical and empirical analysis is to illustrate the
relevance of this ratio, in particular in relation to immigration.
Most of the literature on the impact of immigration on
ageing focuses on the impact of immigration on the labour
market and the welfare state with an emphasis on the short-
run (see Nannestad (2007) for an overview). A drawback
of this focus on short-run issues is that the impact of ageing
and immigration on capital formation and economic growth
usually are ignored. Razin and Sadka (2000) were the first
who analysed the impact of immigration on ageing in a
general equilibrium long-run context, taking this impact
into account. We combine both types of analysis by including
a model of the labour market, with special attention to
wage formation and unemployment, in a concise
macroeconomic model. Both are elaborated below in
section 2 where we also use this model to analyse the
impact of immigration on the problems for the welfare state
resulting from ageing. We argue that an important element
of that impact is the extent to which immigrants find work,
almost irrespective of their skills. In our concluding remarks
in section 3, we report that the empirical implications of our
model can be corroborated in the case of the Netherlands.
Since we find a positive effect of immigration on economic
activity over the last decades, we conclude that indeed for
the Netherlands immigration can be used to alleviate the
ageing problem. We also elaborate on the policy conclusions
in our concluding remarks.
2. 2. 2. 2. 2. The model The model The model The model The model
We first analyse the role of the labour market and then turn
to the macroeconomic model. Finally we discuss the role of
immigration on the economy and the welfare state.
The role of the labour market The role of the labour market The role of the labour market The role of the labour market The role of the labour market
There are three reasons why we pay specific attention to the
labour market in our analysis. First, we have to distinguish
between various skill types, since it may be important to
what extent immigration is relatively skilled or unskilled. We
follow much of the literature in distinguishing between
skilled and unskilled labour and assume capital-skill
complementarity and substitutability between skilled and
unskilled labour.2 Second, we want to be able to include
unemployment in our model, since the incidence of
unemployment is relatively high amongst immigrants. Third,
the analysis should allow us to explain the impact of
immigration on the development of wages, both skilled and
unskilled. The last two elements follow from the introduction
of wage bargaining in the model.
We assume that the skilled labour market is competitive,
which implies that the skilled wage rate is determined by full
employment for the skilled workforce. For unskilled workers
the wage is determined by union bargaining, where the
union takes both employment of skilled workers, which
follows from labour supply, and the capital stock as given.
We assume that unions have a limited bargaining power
and aim to maximise the expected wages, while recognising
that higher wages imply less demand for labour and
unemployed persons receive a certain amount of benefits.3
Once the negotiated wage is determined, firms choose the
level of unskilled employment in such a way that profits are
maximised, given their capital stock and employment of
skilled workers.
The outcome of the wage bargaining process is that the
rate of unskilled unemployment is independent of the size
of the unskilled workforce. That reason is that when more
unskilled workers enter the labour market, this will be
compensated by a decrease in the unskilled negotiated
wage such that most new entrants will be able to find
employment.4 Hence if, for example, the unemployment
rate of unskilled workers is 10% prior to the increase in the
workforce (for instance, because of immigration), it remains
10% thereafter. However, the aggregate rate of
unemployment increases because there are relatively more
unskilled workers.
The decrease of the unskilled wage will be accompanied
with an increase in the skilled wage, since skilled labour
becomes relatively more scarce. However, these wage
movements may be less pronounced than one might expect
at first sight or assumed in public debate. The reason is that
we should also take into account the question of what
happens to capital accumulation. Additional employment
may lead to more capital accumulation, as we argue
below. In that case this reduces the scarcity of skilled
workers relative to unskilled workers, due to the capital-skill
complementarity; hence that has a mitigating effect on the
decrease of the unskilled wage and the increase of the
skilled wage. This brings us to the role of capital accumulation
and the macroeconomic environment.
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The macroeconomic environment The macroeconomic environment The macroeconomic environment The macroeconomic environment The macroeconomic environment
In our concise macroeconomic model we distinguish
between two generations. The majority of the younger
generation (“young” for short) is working, saving and
paying pension contributions; a small part is either
unemployed or not in the labour force. The older generation
(“old” for short) lives from pension benefits, capital income
and dissavings. The pension benefits are financed by the
young in a pay-as-you-go system, at a fixed rate of their
income. The old also have accumulated capital to add to
their pensions.
The young both earn wages and have income from
capital. They consume a share of their disposable income
and save the remaining part. The savings are used for
capital accumulation by the young to add to their pension
benefits later. Disposable income of the old consists of their
income from capital and the pension benefits financed by
the young. The old do not only consume their disposable
income, but also part of their capital stock which leads to
dissavings by the old. Domestic savings then equal savings
of the young minus dissavings of the old.
We explicitly pay attention to social equilibrium in our
model. Next to unemployment compensation, social
equilibrium also requires that consumption per capita of
the old is at least equal to a constant fraction of consumption
per capita of the young. This is a matter of social
responsibility, since the old have contributed in their young
days to the development of the economy as it is now for the
young. Moreover, political reality requires that the old have
sufficient benefits, since they represent a growing part of
the electorate in an ageing economy. The income transfer
from young to old leads to a positive relationship between
the rate of growth in the economy and the premium paid
by the young. A higher rate of growth implies higher
consumption growth of the young relative to the old. It
follows that the young must pay a higher premium to
increase consumption of the old too.
The social equilibrium then can be presented as the
increasing SE-curve in Figure 1, which shows combinations
of rate of growth of the economy g g g g g and the premium t t t t t. One
should realise that the curve will shift downwards when the
number of old increases relative to young. In that case a
higher contribution is needed at the same rate of growth to
obtain social equilibrium.
Figure 1: Economic growth, the IS-curve and the Figure 1: Economic growth, the IS-curve and the Figure 1: Economic growth, the IS-curve and the Figure 1: Economic growth, the IS-curve and the Figure 1: Economic growth, the IS-curve and the
SE-curve SE-curve SE-curve SE-curve SE-curve
An interesting question is to what extent domestic
savings are related to domestic investment.5 One extreme
assumption is that all savings are invested domestically. In
that case a higher premium paid by the young will lead to
less savings and therefore to less investment. Since less
investment also implied less capital accumulation, a lower
rate of growth will result. Thus one might observe a
negative relationship between premiums paid by the young
and the rate of growth of the economy. This is depicted by
the IS-curve in Figure 1. Another extreme assumption is that
there is free capital mobility and the interest rate is determined
by the world interest rate. As a consequence growth is
determined by capital accumulation at a given world
interest rate, irrespective of domestic savings and hence
irrespective of the premium paid by the young. In terms of
Figure 1, if this would occur a rate of growth g*, the social
equilibrium, represented by the SE-curve then determines
the rate of contributions at t*. The IS-curve then is not a
relevant concept. It seems reasonable to assume that reality
is between the two extremes. It is reasonable to assume that
domestic savings influence domestic investment at least to
some extent.6 In that case a downward sloping IS-curve is
relevant, as is depicted in Figure 1.
In our simple model growth is determined by the
relation between savings and investment on the one hand
and social equilibrium on the other. In terms of Figure 1 this
occurs on the intersection of the IS-curve and the SE-curve,
at a rate of growth g*. The rate of contributions then is t*.
The impact of ageing and immigration The impact of ageing and immigration The impact of ageing and immigration The impact of ageing and immigration The impact of ageing and immigration
It follows from the analysis above that the ageing of the
economy induces a downward shift of the SE-curve, following
an increase in the ratio of old to young. This leads both to
a lower rate of growth and a higher rate of contributions.
From that perspective it is not surprising that economic
policy is focusing on reducing the ratio of old relative to
young – or more precisely, to increase the ratio of the
working population to the inactive population. One way to
enhance this process is to increase the retirement age – in
the model some “old” then become “young” and the SE-
curve shifts upwards in Figure 1. Another way is to encourage
immigration which usually consists of young persons. This
would lead to both an upward shift in the SE-curve and
increased economic growth through growth in labour
supply. In both cases a higher rate of growth can be
realised without increasing the rate of contributions. In our
view this is also intuitively understood by the European
Union in its advice to allow for more immigration (EU,
2005).
3. 3. 3. 3. 3. Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion
The main conclusion from our analysis is that income per
capita will increase due to immigration, under the condition
that the rate of unemployment does not increase. The
highly-skilled workers will profit anyway from the usual low-
skilled immigration, and there may be important
distributional effects for the low-skilled and the retired. The
increase in capital accumulation following immigration
turns out to be an important determinant of economic
growth when analysing the benefits of immigration.
Our empirical analysis for the Netherlands reveals that
there are least two conditions that must be satisfied in order
to get a positive impact of immigration on the economy.
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First, immigrants should get employed to stimulate economic
growth. Second, the proportion of low-skilled immigrants
in the total number of immigrants should not be higher than
the proportion among natives to prevent unemployment
from rising. Thus to stimulate investments and economic
growth it is of utmost importance that immigration policy as
a means to mitigate the aging problem should not only
focus on the number of immigrants, but also on their
employability by keeping the skill structure in line with the
skill distribution of domestic labour market entrants. This
requires two steps: (1) skill-neutral screening of immigrants
and (2) an education policy that has the aim and ability to
educate the second and third generations of immigrants, at
least in line with the average skill distribution in a country.
Our conclusions support the view of the European
Commission that immigrants in general have a positive
impact on the economy provided that they are employed.
As the European Commission puts it: “the current situation
and prospects of EU labour markets can be broadly
described as a “need” scenario. Some Member States
already experience substantial labour and skills shortages
in certain sectors of the economy, which cannot be filled
within the national labour markets. This phenomenon
concerns the full range of qualifications – from unskilled
workers to top academic professionals.” (EU, 2005a, p. 4).
In line with this statement by the European Commission we
argue that the immigration policy of the European Union
with respect to the blue card and the admission of some
other specific groups are too restrictive and do not maximise
the benefits from immigration in the light of an ageing
population.
Finally, immigration should not be regarded as the sole
cure for falling birth rates and ageing population, since it
is only one policy instrument within a broader mix of
instruments. Immigration policies should go hand in hand
with active labour market policies and education policies to
get the low-skilled unemployed back to work and to prevent
young people, both native and immigrant, from leaving
school leaving. Instead they should aim to raise their level
of education and opportunities on the labour market.
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NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES
* Prof. Dr Joan Muysken, Department of Economics, Maastricht
University, with the collaboration of Frank Cörvers, Research
Centre for Education and the Labor Market (ROA), Maastricht
University, and Thomas Ziesemer, UNU/MERIT and
Department of Economics, Maastricht University.
1 See Wilson et al. (2007) for the employment opportunities in
elementary and low-skill occupations in the European Union.
2 See for instance Ben-Gad (2008). This also allows for more
flexibility in the substitution between skilled and unskilled
labour compared to the simple production structure which is
usually assumed in this type of analysis (Kemnitz, 2003; Boeri
and Brückner, 2005).
3 This is more general than assuming that the union unilaterally
sets the wage, as for instance in Kemnitz (2003).
4 Unemployment benefits will decrease too, since we assume
that government has set a fixed ratio of benefits to unskilled
wages. Total unemployment benefits are financed out of
premiums on wages.
5 In Muysken et al. (2008a) we assume that domestic savings
fully lead to investment, whereas in Muysken et al. (2008b) we
assume that there is no relationship whatsoever.
6 Feldstein en Horioka found that in each economy savings and
investment correlate strongly over time – see Farmer en Lahiri
(2006) for a recent confirmation of this finding.